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Abstract
In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive
game. We shall apply this analytical model of coopetition (based on normal form
game theory) to the Greek crisis, while conceiving this game theory model at a
macro level. We construct two realizations of such model, trying to represent
possible realistic macro-economic scenarios of the Germany-Greek strategic in-
teraction. We shall suggest - after a deep and complete study of the two samples
- feasible transferable utility solutions in a properly coopetitive perspective for the
divergent interests which drive the economic policies in the euro area.
Keywords. Games and economics; competition; cooperation; coopetition.
1 Introduction
Greece, a country that represents just over 2% of gross domestic product of the Euro
area, has led to a deep and widespread crisis in Europe. The Greek economy is locked
into a serious and difficult crisis, due to its lack of competitiveness and is still at risk of
insolvency, because of its public finance mismanagement. Although the EU Govern-
ments and the IMF have provided substantial financial assistance to cover the refinanc-
ing needs of Greece in exchange of a serious and though austerity program, and even,
the banks have agreed a heavy haircut on the Greek debts, the Greek economy is still
on the brink of collapse. Germany, on the other hand, is the most competitive economy
of the Euro Area and has a large trade surplus with Greece and other Euro partners;
hence significant trade imbalances occur within the Euro Area.
The main purpose of our paper is to explore win-win solutions for Greece and Ger-
many, involving a German increasing demand of a pre-determined Greek exports. We
do not analyze the causes of the financial crisis in Greece and its relevant political and
institutional effects on the European Monetary Union. Rather we concentrate on stabil-
ity and growth, which should drive the economic policy of Greece and the other Euro
countries.
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Organization of the paper. The work is organized as follows:
• section 2 examines the Greek crisis, suggesting a possible way out to reduce the
intra-eurozone imbalances through coopetitive solutions within a growth path;
• section 3 presents the original model of coopetitive game introduced in the liter-
ature by D. Carfı`;
• section 4 proposes possible solutions concepts for the original model of coopet-
itive game;
• section 5, very briefly, provides the general ideas we follow, in this paper, for the
applications of coopetitive games to the Eurozone context;
• section 6 provides a first sample of coopetitive game applied to the Eurozone
context, showing possible coopetitive solutions; we propose the first sample in
an intentionally simplified fashion (without direct strategic interactions among
players) to emphasize the new role and procedures of coopetition;
• section 7 provides a second sample of coopetitive game applied to the Eurozone
context, showing possible coopetitive solutions; we propose a linear model, with
a direct strategic interactions among players;
• conclusions end up the paper.
Section 2 of this paper has been written by D. Schiliro` while sections from 3 to
7 are due to D. Carfı`, however, in strict joint cooperation. Abstract, introduction and
conclusions were written by both authors, together.
2 The Greek Crisis and the coopetitive solution
The deep financial crisis of Greece, which was almost causing the default of its sovereign
debt, has revealed the weaknesses of Greek economy, particularly its lack of compet-
itiveness, but also the mismanagement of the public finance and the difficulties of the
banking sector.
2.1 The crisis and the Greek economy
With the outbreak of the global crisis of 2008-2009, Greece relied on state spending
to drive growth, so the country has accumulated a huge public debt. This has created
deep concerns about its fiscal sustainability, and its financial exposition has prevented
the Greek government to find capitals in the financial markets. In addition, Greece has
lost competitiveness since joining the European Monetary Union and, because of that,
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Greek’s unit labor cost rose over 30 percent from 2000 to 2010. The austerity measures
implemented by the Greek government are hitting hard the Greek economy, since its
growth is continuing to be expected negative also this year (2012), making the financial
recovery very problematic [Mussa (2010)]. Furthermore, Greece exports are much less
than imports, so the trade balance shows a deficit above 10% of its GDP. Therefore, the
focus of economic policy of Greece should become its productive system and growth
must be the major goal for the Greek economy in a medium term perspective. This
surely would help its re-equilibrium process.
2.2 The soundest European economy: Germany
Germany, on the other hand, is considered the soundest European economy. It is the
world’s second-biggest exporter, but its wide commercial surplus is originated mainly
by the exports in the Euro area, that accounts for about two thirds. Furthermore, since
2000 its export share has gradually increased vis-a`-vis industrial countries. Thus Ger-
many’s growth path has been driven by exports. We do not discuss in this work the
factors explaining Germany’s increase in export share, but we observe that its interna-
tional competitiveness has been improving, with the unit labor cost which has been kept
fairly constant, since wages have essentially kept pace with productivity. Therefore the
prices of the German products have been relatively low, favoring the export of German
goods towards the euro countries and towards the markets around the world, especially
those of the emerging economies (China, India, Brazil, Russia). Finally, since 2010
Germany has recovered very well from the 2008-2009 global crisis and it is growing at
a higher rate than the others Euro partners.
Therefore we share the view that Germany (and the other surplus countries of the
Euro area) should contribute to overcome the crisis of Greek economy stimulating its
demand of goods from Greece and relying less on exports towards the Euro area in gen-
eral. Germany, as some economists as Posen [2010] and Abadi [2010] underlined, has
benefited from being the anchor economy for the Eurozone over the last 11 years. For
instance, in 2009, during a time of global contraction, Germany has been a beneficiary,
being able to run a sustained trade surplus with its European neighbors. Germany is
exporting to Greece far more than it imports.
2.3 A win-win solution for Greece and Germany
Thus we believe that an economic policy that aims at adjusting government budget
and trade imbalances and looks at improving the growth path of the real economy
in the medium and long term in Greece is the only possible one to assure a stable re-
balancing of the Greek economy and also to contribute to the stability of the whole euro
area [Schiliro`, 2011]. As we have already argued, German modest wage increases and
weak domestic demand favored the export of German goods towards the euro countries.
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We suggest, in accordance with Posen [2010], a win-win solution (a win-win solution
is the outcome of a game which is designed in a way that all participants can profit
from it in one way or the other), which entails that Germany, which still represents the
leading economy, should re-balance its trade surplus and thus ease the pressure on the
southern countries of the euro area, particularly Greece. Obviously, we are aware that
this is a mere hypothesis and that our framework of coopetition is a normative model.
However, we believe that a cooperative attitude must be taken within the members of
the European monetary union. Thus we pursue our hypothesis and suggest a model of
coopetitive game as an innovative instrument to analyze possible solutions to obtain a
win-win outcome for Greece and Germany, which would also help the whole economy
of the euro area.
2.4 Our coopetitive model
The two strategic variables of our model are investments and exports for Greece, since
this country must concentrate on them to improve the structure of production and its
competitiveness, but also shift its aggregate demand towards a higher growth path in
the medium term. Thus Greece should focus on innovative investments, specially in-
vestments in knowledge [Schiliro`, 2010], to change and improve its production struc-
ture and to increase its production capacity and its productivity. As a result of that its
competitiveness will improve. An economic policy that focuses on investments and ex-
ports, instead of consumptions, will address Greece towards a sustainable growth and,
consequently, its financial reputation and economic stability will also increase. On the
other hand, the strategic variable of our model for Germany are private consumption
and imports.
The idea which is driving our model to solve the Greek crisis is based on a notion
of coopetition where the cooperative aspect will prevail. Thus we are not talking about
a situation in which Germany and Greece are competing in the same European market
for the same products, rather we are assuming a situation in which Germany stimulates
its domestic demand and, in doing so, will create a larger market for products from
abroad. We are also envisaging the case where Germany purchases a greater quantity
of Greek products, in this case Greece increases its exports, selling more products to
Germany. The final results will be that Greece will find itself in a better position, but
also Germany will get an economic advantage determined by the higher growth in the
two countries. In addition, there is the important advantage of a greater stability within
the European Monetary system. Finally our model will provide a new set of tools based
on the notion of coopetition, that could be fruitful for the setting of the euro area eco-
nomic policy issues.
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2.5 The coopetition in our model
The concept of coopetition was essentially devised at micro-economic level for strate-
gic management solutions by Brandenburger and Nalebuff [1995], who suggest, given
the competitive paradigm [Porter, 1985], to consider also a cooperative behavior to
achieve a win-win outcome for both players. Therefore, in our model, coopetition
represents the synthesis between the competitive paradigm [Porter, 1985] and the co-
operative paradigm [Gulati, Nohria, Zaheer, 2000; Stiles, 2001]. Coopetition is, in our
approach, a complex theoretical construct and it is the result of the interplay between
competition and cooperation. Thus, we suggest a model of coopetitive games, applied
at a macroeconomic level, which intends to offer possible solutions to the partially di-
vergent interests of Germany and Greece in a perspective of a cooperative attitude that
should drive their policies.
3 Coopetitive games
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we develop and apply the mathematical model of a coopetitive game
introduced by David Carfı` in [11] and [6]. The idea of coopetitive game is already
used, in a mostly intuitive and non-formalized way, in Strategic Management Studies
(see for example Brandenburgher and Nalebuff).
3.1.1 The idea.
A coopetitive game is a game in which two or more players (participants) can interact
cooperatively and non-cooperatively at the same time. Even Brandenburger and Nale-
buff, creators of coopetition, did not define, precisely, a quantitative way to implement
coopetition in the Game Theory context.
The problem to implement the notion of coopetition in Game Theory is summarized
in the following question:
• how do, in normal form games, cooperative and non-cooperative interactions
can live together simultaneously, in a Brandenburger-Nalebuff sense?
In order to explain the above question, consider a classic two-player normal-form
gain game G = (f,>) - such a game is a pair in which f is a vector valued function
defined on a Cartesian product E × F with values in the Euclidean plane R2 and > is
the natural strict sup-order of the Euclidean plane itself (the sup-order is indicating that
the game, with payoff function f , is a gain game and not a loss game). Let E and F
be the strategy sets of the two players in the game G. The two players can choose the
respective strategies x ∈ E and y ∈ F
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• cooperatively (exchanging information and making binding agreements);
• not-cooperatively (not exchanging information or exchanging information but
without possibility to make binding agreements).
The above two behavioral ways are mutually exclusive, at least in normal-form games:
• the two ways cannot be adopted simultaneously in the model of normal-form
game (without using convex probability mixtures, but this is not the way sug-
gested by Brandenburger and Nalebuff in their approach);
• there is no room, in the classic normal form game model, for a simultaneous
(non-probabilistic) employment of the two behavioral extremes cooperation and
non-cooperation.
3.1.2 Towards a possible solution.
Firstly David Carfı` in [6] and then D. Carfı` with D. Schiliro` in [11] have proposed a
manner to overcome this impasse, according to the idea of coopetition in the sense of
Brandenburger and Nalebuff. In a Carfı`’s coopetitive game model,
• the players of the game have their respective strategy-sets (in which they can
choose cooperatively or not cooperatively);
• there is a common strategy setC containing other strategies (possibly of different
type with respect to those in the respective classic strategy sets) that must be
chosen cooperatively;
• the strategy set C can also be structured as a Cartesian product (similarly to
the profile strategy space of normal form games), but in any case the strategies
belonging to this new set C must be chosen cooperatively.
3.2 The model for n-players
We give in the following the definition of coopetitive game proposed by Carfı` (in [11]
and [6]).
Definition (of n-player coopetitive game). Let E = (Ei)ni=1 be a finite n-family
of non-empty sets and let C be another non-empty set. We define n-player coopetitive
gain game over the strategy support (E,C) any pair G = (f,>), where f is a vector
function from the Cartesian product ×E × C (here ×E denotes the classic strategy-
profile space of n-player normal form games, i.e. the Cartesian product of the family
E) into the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn and > is the natural sup-order of this
last Euclidean space. The element of the set C will be called cooperative strategies of
the game.
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A particular aspect of our coopetitive game model is that any coopetitive game G
determines univocally a family of classic normal-form games and vice versa; so that
any coopetitive game could be defined as a family of normal-form games. In what
follows we precise this very important aspect of the model.
Definition (the family of normal-form games associated with a coopetitive game).
Let G = (f,>) be a coopetitive game over a strategic support (E,C). And let
g = (gz)z∈C
be the family of classic normal-form games whose member gz is, for any cooperative
strategy z in C, the normal-form game
Gz := (f(., z), >),
where the payoff function f(., z) is the section
f(., z) : ×E → Rn
of the function f , defined (as usual) by
f(., z)(x) = f(x, z),
for every point x in the strategy profile space ×E. We call the family g (so defined)
family of normal-form games associated with (or determined by) the game G and we
call normal section of the game G any member of the family g.
We can prove this (obvious) theorem.
Theorem. The family g of normal-form games associated with a coopetitive game
G uniquely determines the game. In more rigorous and complete terms, the correspon-
dence G 7→ g is a bijection of the space of all coopetitive games - over the strategy
support (E,C) - onto the space of all families of normal form games - over the strategy
support E - indexed by the set C.
Proof. This depends totally from the fact that we have the following natural bijec-
tion between function spaces:
F(×E × C,Rn)→ F(C,F(×E,Rn)) : f 7→ (f(., z))z∈C ,
which is a classic result of theory of sets. 
Thus, the exam of a coopetitive game should be equivalent to the exam of a whole
family of normal-form games (in some sense we shall specify).
In this paper we suggest how this latter examination can be conducted and what
are the solutions corresponding to the main concepts of solution which are known in
the literature for the classic normal-form games, in the case of two-player coopetitive
games.
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3.3 Two players coopetitive games
In this section we specify the definition and related concepts of two-player coopetitive
games; sometimes (for completeness) we shall repeat some definitions of the preceding
section.
Definition (of coopetitive game). Let E, F and C be three nonempty sets. We
define two player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C) any
pair of the form G = (f,>), where f is a function from the Cartesian product E×F ×
C into the real Euclidean plane R2 and the binary relation > is the usual sup-order
of the Cartesian plane (defined component-wise, for every couple of points p and q, by
p > q iff pi > qi, for each index i).
Remark (coopetitive games and normal form games). The difference among a
two-player normal-form (gain) game and a two player coopetitive (gain) game is the
fundamental presence of the third strategy Cartesian-factor C. The presence of this
third set C determines a total change of perspective with respect to the usual exam of
two-player normal form games, since we now have to consider a normal form game
G(z), for every element z of the set C; we have, then, to study an entire ordered family
of normal form games in its own totality, and we have to define a new manner to study
these kind of game families.
3.4 Terminology and notation
Definitions. Let G = (f,>) be a two player coopetitive gain game carried by the
strategic triple (E,F,C). We will use the following terminologies:
• the function f is called the payoff function of the game G;
• the first component f1 of the payoff function f is called payoff function of the
first player and analogously the second component f2 is called payoff function
of the second player;
• the set E is said strategy set of the first player and the set F the strategy set of
the second player;
• the set C is said the cooperative (or common) strategy set of the two players;
• the Cartesian product E × F × C is called the (coopetitive) strategy space of
the game G.
Memento. The first component f1 of the payoff function f of a coopetitive game
G is the function of the strategy space E × F × C of the game G into the real line R
defined by the first projection
f1(x, y, z) := pr1(f(x, y, z)),
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for every strategic triple (x, y, z) in E × F × C; in a similar fashion we proceed for
the second component f2 of the function f .
Interpretation. We have:
• two players, or better an ordered pair (1, 2) of players;
• anyone of the two players has a strategy set in which to choose freely his own
strategy;
• the two players can/should cooperatively choose strategies z in a third common
strategy set C;
• the two players will choose (after the exam of the entire game G) their cooper-
ative strategy z in order to maximize (in some sense we shall define) the vector
gain function f .
3.5 Normal form games of a coopetitive game
Let G be a coopetitive game in the sense of above definitions. For any cooperative
strategy z selected in the cooperative strategy space C, there is a corresponding normal
form gain game
Gz = (p(z), >),
upon the strategy pair (E,F ), where the payoff function p(z) is the section
f(., z) : E × F → R2,
of the payoff function f of the coopetitive game - the section is defined, as usual, on
the competitive strategy space E × F , by
f(., z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
for every bi-strategy (x, y) in the bi-strategy space E × F .
Let us formalize the concept of game-family associated with a coopetitive game.
Definition (the family associated with a coopetitive game). Let G = (f,>) be a
two player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C). We naturally
can associate with the game G a family g = (gz)z∈C of normal-form games defined by
gz := Gz = (f(., z), >),
for every z in C, which we shall call the family of normal-form games associated with
the coopetitive game G.
Remark. It is clear that with any above family of normal form games
g = (gz)z∈C ,
with gz = (f(., z), >), we can associate:
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• a family of payoff spaces
(imf(., z))z∈C ,
with members in the payoff universe R2;
• a family of Pareto maximal boundary
(∂∗Gz)z∈C ,
with members contained in the payoff universe R2;
• a family of suprema
(supGz)z∈C ,
with members belonging to the payoff universe R2;
• a family of Nash zones
(N (Gz))z∈C ;
with members contained in the strategy space E × F ;
• a family of conservative bi-values
v# = (v#z )z∈C ;
in the payoff universe R2.
And so on, for every meaningful known feature of a normal form game.
Moreover, we can interpret any of the above families as set-valued paths in the
strategy space E × F or in the payoff universe R2.
It is just the study of these induced families which becomes of great interest in the
examination of a coopetitive game G and which will enable us to define (or suggest)
the various possible solutions of a coopetitive game.
4 Solutions of a coopetitive game
4.1 Introduction
The two players of a coopetitive gameG - according to the general economic principles
of monotonicity of preferences and of non-satiation - should choose the cooperative
strategy z in C in order that:
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• the reasonable Nash equilibria of the game Gz are f -preferable than the reason-
able Nash equilibria in each other game Gz′ ;
• the supremum of Gz is greater (in the sense of the usual order of the Cartesian
plane) than the supremum of any other game Gz′ ;
• the Pareto maximal boundary of Gz is higher than that of any other game Gz′ ;
• the Nash bargaining solutions in Gz are f -preferable than those in Gz′ ;
• in general, fixed a common kind of solution for any game Gz , say S(z) the set
of these kind of solutions for the game Gz , we can consider the problem to find
all the optimal solutions (in the sense of Pareto) of the set valued path S, defined
on the cooperative strategy set C. Then, we should face the problem of selection
of reasonable Pareto strategies in the set-valued path S via proper selection
methods (Nash-bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky and so on).
Moreover, we shall consider the maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff space
im(f) as an appropriate zone for the bargaining solutions.
The payoff function of a two person coopetitive game is (as in the case of normal-
form game) a vector valued function with values belonging to the Cartesian plane R2.
We note that in general the above criteria are multi-criteria and so they will generate
multi-criteria optimization problems.
In this section we shall define rigorously some kind of solution, for two player
coopetitive games, based on a bargaining method, namely a Kalai-Smorodinsky bar-
gaining type. Hence, first of all, we have to precise what kind of bargaining method we
are going to use.
4.2 Bargaining problems
In this paper, we shall propose and use the following original extended (and quite gen-
eral) definition of bargaining problem and, consequently, a natural generalization of
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. In the economic literature, several examples of extended
bargaining problems and extended Kalai-Smorodinski solutions are already presented.
The essential root of these various extended versions of bargaining problems is the
presence of utopia points not-directly constructed by the disagreement points and the
strategy constraints. Moreover, the Kalai-type solution, of such extended bargaining
problems, is always defined as a Pareto maximal point belonging to the segment join-
ing the disagreement point with the utopia point (if any such Pareto point does exist):
we shall follow the same way. In order to find suitable new win-win solutions of our re-
alistic coopetitive economic problems, we need such new kind of versatile extensions.
For what concerns the existence of our new extended Kalai solutions, for the economic
problems we are facing, we remark that conditions of compactness and strict convexity
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will naturally hold; we remark, otherwise, that, in this paper, we are not interested in
proving general or deep mathematical results, but rather to find reasonable solutions
for new economic coopetitive context.
Definition (of bargaining problem). Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane R2
and let a and b be two points of the plane with the following properties:
• they belong to the small interval containing S, if this interval is defined (in-
deed, it is well defined if and only if S is bounded and it is precisely the interval
[inf S, supS]≤ );
• they are such that a < b;
• the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S,
among the interval [a, b]≤ with end points a and b (it is the set of points greater
than a and less than b, it is not the segment [a, b]) and the maximal boundary of
S is non-empty.
In these conditions, we call bargaining problem on S corresponding to the pair
of extreme points (a, b), the pair
P = (S, (a, b)).
Every point in the intersection among the interval [a, b]≤ and the Pareto maximal
boundary of S is called possible solution of the problem P . Some time the first extreme
point of a bargaining problem is called the initial point of the problem (or disagree-
ment point or threat point) and the second extreme point of a bargaining problem is
called utopia point of the problem.
In the above conditions, when S is convex, the problem P is said to be convex and
for this case we can find in the literature many existence results for solutions of P en-
joying prescribed properties (Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, Nash bargaining solutions
and so on ...).
Remark. Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane R2 and let a and b two points of
the plane belonging to the smallest interval containing S and such that a ≤ b. Assume
the Pareto maximal boundary of S be non-empty. If a and b are a lower bound and an
upper bound of the maximal Pareto boundary, respectively, then the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S
is obviously not empty. In particular, if a and b are the extrema of S (or the extrema of
the Pareto boundary S∗ = ∂∗S) we can consider the following bargaining problem
P = (S, (a, b)), (or P = (S∗, (a, b)))
and we call this particular problem a standard bargaining problem on S (or standard
bargaining problem on the Pareto maximal boundary S∗).
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4.3 Kalai solution for bargaining problems
Note the following property.
Property. If (S, (a, b)) is a bargaining problem with a < b, then there is at most
one point in the intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
where [a, b] is the segment joining the two points a and b.
Proof. Since if a point p of the segment [a, b] belongs to the Pareto boundary ∂∗S,
no other point of the segment itself can belong to Pareto boundary, since the segment
is a totally ordered subset of the plane (remember that a < b). 
Definition (Kalai-Smorodinsky). We call Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (or best
compromise solution) of the bargaining problem (S, (a, b)) the unique point of the
intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
if this intersection is non empty.
So, in the above conditions, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution k (if it exists) enjoys
the following property: there is a real r in [0, 1] such that
k = a+ r(b− a),
or
k − a = r(b− a),
hence
k2 − a2
k1 − a1 =
b2 − a2
b1 − a1 ,
if the above ratios are defined; these last equality is the characteristic property of Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions.
We end the subsection with the following definition.
Definition (of Pareto boundary). We call Pareto boundary every subset M of an
ordered space which has only pairwise incomparable elements.
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4.4 Nash (proper) solution of a coopetitive game
Let N := N (G) be the union of the Nash-zone family of a coopetitive game G, that
is the union of the family (N (Gz))z∈C of all Nash-zones of the game family g =
(gz)z∈C associated to the coopetitive game G. We call Nash path of the game G the
multi-valued path
z 7→ N (Gz)
and Nash zone of G the trajectory N of the above multi-path. Let N∗ be the Pareto
maximal boundary of the Nash zone N . We can consider the bargaining problem
PN = (N∗, inf(N∗), sup(N∗)).
Definition. If the above bargaining problem PN has a Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
k, we say that k is the properly coopetitive solution of the coopetitive game G.
The term “properly coopetitive” is clear:
• this solution k is determined by cooperation on the common strategy set C and
to be selfish (competitive in the Nash sense) on the bi-strategy space E × F .
4.5 Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game
It is possible, for coopetitive games, to define other kind of solutions, which are not
properly coopetitive, but realistic and sometime affordable. These kind of solutions
are, we can say, super-cooperative.
Let us show some of these kind of solutions.
Consider a coopetitive game G and
• its Pareto maximal boundaryM and the corresponding pair of extrema (aM , bM );
• the Nash zone N (G) of the game in the payoff space and its extrema (aN , bN );
• the conservative set-value G# (the set of all conservative values of the family g
associated with the coopetitive game G) and its extrema (a#, b#).
We call:
• Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise solution (K-S
solution) of the problem
(M, (aM , bM )),
if this solution exists;
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• Nash-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise solution
of the problem
(M, (bN , bM ))
if this solution exists;
• conservative-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise
of the problem
(M, (b#, bM ))
if this solution exists.
4.6 Transferable utility solutions
Other possible compromises we suggest are the following.
Consider the transferable utility Pareto boundary M of the coopetitive game G,
that is the set of all points p in the Euclidean plane (universe of payoffs), between the
extrema of G, such that their sum
+(p) := p1 + p2
is equal to the maximum value of the addition + of the real lineR over the payoff space
f(E × F × C) of the game G.
Definition (TU Pareto solution). We call transferable utility compromise solution
of the coopetitive game G the solution of any bargaining problem (M, (a, b)), where
• a and b are points of the smallest interval containing the payoff space of G
• b is a point strongly greater than a;
• M is the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the game G;
• the points a and b belong to different half-planes determined by M .
Note that the above fourth axiom is equivalent to require that the segment joining
the points a and b intersect M .
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4.7 Win-win solutions
In the applications, if the game G has a member G0 of its family which can be consid-
ered as an “initial game” - in the sense that the pre-coopetitive situation is represented
by this normal form game G0 - the aims of our study (following the standard ideas on
coopetitive interactions) are
• to “enlarge the pie”;
• to obtain a win-win solution with respect to the initial situation.
So that we will choose as a threat point a in TU problem (M, (a, b)) the supremum
of the initial game G0.
Definition (of win-win solution). Let (G, z0) be a coopetitive game with an initial
point, that is a coopetitive game G with a fixed common strategy z0 (of its common
strategy set C). We call the game Gz0 as the initial game of (G, z0). We call win-win
solution of the game (G, z0) any strategy profile s = (x, y, z) such that the payoff of
G at s is strictly greater than the supremum L of the payoff core of the initial game
G(z0).
Remark 1. The payoff core of a normal form gain game G is the portion of the
Pareto maximal boundary G∗ of the game which is greater than the conservative bi-
value of G.
Remark 2. From an applicative point of view, the above requirement (to be strictly
greater than L) is very strong. More realistically, we can consider as win-win solutions
those strategy profiles which are strictly greater than any reasonable solution of the
initial game Gz0 .
Remark 3. Strictly speaking, a win-win solution could be not Pareto efficient: it is
a situation in which the players both gain with respect to an initial condition (and this
is exactly the idea we follow in the rigorous definition given above).
Remark 4. In particular, observe that, if the collective payoff function
+(f) = f1 + f2
has a maximum (on the strategy profile space S) strictly greater than the collective
payoff L1 + L2 at the supremum L of the payoff core of the game Gz0 , the portion
M(> L) of Transferable Utility Pareto boundary M which is greater than L is non-
void and it is a segment. So that we can choose as a threat point a in our problem
(M, (a, b)) the supremum L of the payoff core of the initial game G0 to obtain some
compromise solution.
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4.7.1 Standard win-win solution.
A natural choice for the utopia point b is the supremum of the portion M≥a of the
transferable utility Pareto boundary M which is upon (greater than) this point a:
M≥a = {m ∈M : m ≥ a}.
4.7.2 Non standard win-win solution.
Another kind of solution can be obtained by choosing b as the supremum of the portion
of M that is bounded between the minimum and maximum value of that player i that
gains more in the coopetitive interaction, in the sense that
max(pri(imf))−max(pri(imf0)) > max(pr3−i(imf))−max(pr3−i(imf0)).
4.7.3 Final general remarks.
In the development of a coopetitive game, we consider:
• a first virtual phase, in which the two players make a binding agreement on what
cooperative strategy z should be selected from the cooperative set C, in order to
respect their own rationality.
• then, a second virtual phase, in which the two players choose their strategies
forming the profile (x, y) to implement in the game G(z).
Now, in the second phase of our coopetitive game G we consider the following 4
possibilities:
1. the two players are non-cooperative in the second phase and they do or do not
exchange info, but the players choose (in any case) Nash equilibrium strategies
for the game G(z); in this case, for some rationality reason, the two players have
devised that the chosen equilibrium is the “better equilibrium choice” in the en-
tire game G; we have here only one binding agreement in the entire development
of the game;
2. the two players are cooperative also in the second phase and they make a binding
agreement in order to choose a Pareto payoff on the coopetitive Pareto boundary;
in this case we need two binding agreements in the entire development of the
game;
3. the two players are cooperative also in the second phase and they make two bind-
ing agreements, in order to reach the Pareto payoff (on the coopetitive Pareto
boundary) with maximum collective gain (first agreement) and to share the col-
lective gain according to a certain subdivision (second agreement); in this case
we need three binding agreements in the entire development of the game;
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4. the two players are non-cooperative in the second phase (and they do or do not
exchange information), the player choose (in any case) Nash equilibrium strate-
gies; the two players have devised that the chosen equilibrium is the equilibrium
with maximum collective gain and they make only one binding agreement to
share the collective gain according to a certain subdivision; in this case we need
two binding agreements in the entire development of the game.
5 Coopetitive games for Greek crisis
Our first hypothesis is that Germany must stimulate the domestic demand and to re-
balance its trade surplus in favor of Greece. The second hypothesis is that Greece, a
country with a declining competitiveness of its products and a small export share, aims
at growth by undertaking innovative investments and by increasing its exports primarily
towards Germany and also towards the other euro countries.
The coopetitive models that we propose hereunder must be interpreted as normative
models, in the sense that:
• they impose some clear a priori conditions to be respected, by binding contracts,
in order to enlarge the possible outcomes of both countries;
• consequently, they show appropriate win-win strategy solutions, chosen by con-
sidering both competitive and cooperative behaviors, simultaneously;
• finally, they propose appropriate fair divisions of the win-win payoff solutions.
The strategy spaces of the two models are:
• the strategy set of Germany E, set of all possible consumptions of Germany,
in our model, given in a conventional monetary unit; we shall assume that the
strategies of Germany directly influence only Germany pay-off;
• the strategy set of Greece F , set of all possible investments of Greece, in our
model, given in a conventional monetary unit (different from the above Germany
monetary unit); we shall assume that the strategies of Greece directly influence
only Greece pay-off;
• a shared strategy set C, whose elements are determined together by the two
countries, when they choose their own respective strategies x and y, Germany
and Greece. Every strategy z in C represents an amount - given in a third con-
ventional monetary unit - of Greek exports imported into Germany, by respecting
a binding contract.
Therefore, in the two models, we assume that Germany and Greece define the set
of coopetitive strategies.
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6 The first model
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that:
• any real number x, belonging to the unit interval U := [0, 1], can represent a
consumption of Germany (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number y, in the same unit interval U , can represent an investment of
Greece (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number z, again in U , can be the amount of Greek exports which is
imported by Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
6.1 Payoff function of Germany
We assume that the payoff function of Germany f1 is its gross domestic demand:
• f1 is equal to the private consumption function C1 plus the gross investment
function I1 plus government spending (that we shall assume equal 0, or constant)
plus export function X1 minus the import function M1, that is
f1 = C1 + I1 +X1 −M1.
We assume that:
• the private consumption function C1 is the first projection of the strategic Carte-
sian cube U3, that is defined by
C1(x, y, z) = x,
for every consumption x in U , since we assume the private consumption of Ger-
many the first strategic component of strategy profiles in U3;
• the gross investment function I1 is constant on the cube U3, and by translation
we can suppose I1 equal zero;
• the export function X1 is defined by
X1(x, y, z) = (1 + x)
−1,
for every consumption x of Germany; so we assume that the export function X1
is a strictly decreasing function with respect to the first argument;
• the import function M1 is the third projection of the strategic cube, namely
M1(x, y, z) = z,
for every z ∈ U , because we assume the import function M1 depending only
upon the cooperative strategy z of the coopetitive game G, our third strategic
component of the strategy profiles in U3.
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Recap. We then assume as payoff function of Germany its gross domestic demand
f1, which in our model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the strategic cube U3, to the
sum of the strategies x, −z with the export function X1, viewed as a reaction function
with respect to the German domestic consumption (so that f1 is the difference of the
first and third projection of the Cartesian product U3 plus the function export function
X1).
Concluding, the payoff function of Germany is the function f1 of the cube U3 into
the real line R, defined by
f1(x, y, z) = x+ 1/(x+ 1)− z,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3; where the reaction function X1, defined from
the unit interval U into the real line R by
X1(x) = 1/(x+ 1),
for every consumption x of Germany in the interval U , is the export function of Ger-
many mapping the level x of consumption into the level X1(x) of German export
corresponding to that consumption level x.
The function X1 is a strictly decreasing function, and only this monotonicity is the
relevant property of X1 for our coopetitive model.
6.2 Payoff function of Greece
We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again its gross domestic demand -
private consumption C2 plus gross investment I2 plus government spending (assumed
to be 0) plus exports X2 minus imports M2),
f2 = C2 + I2 +X2 −M2.
We assume that:
• the function C2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the private con-
sumption independent from the choice of the strategic triple (x, y, z) in the cube
U3, in other terms we assume the function C2 constant on the cube U3 and by
translation we can suppose C2 itself equal zero;
• the function I2 is defined by
I2(x, y, z) = y + nz,
for every (x, y, z) in U3 (see later for the justification);
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• the export function X2 is the linear function defined by
X2(x, y, z) = z +my,
for every (x, y, z) in U3 (see later for the justification);
• the function M2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the import func-
tion independent from the choice of the triple (x, y, z) in U3, in other terms we
assume the import function M2 constant on the cube U3 and, by translation, we
can suppose the import M2 equal zero.
So the payoff function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the cube U3 into the
real line R, defined by
f2(x, y, z) = (y + nz) + (z +my) = (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z,
for every pair (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian cube U3.
We note that the function f2 does not depend upon the strategies x in U chosen by
Germany and that f2 is a linear function.
The definition of the functions investment I2 and export X2 must be studied deeply
and carefully, and are fundamental to find the win-win solution.
• For every investment strategy y in U , the term my represents the quantity (mon-
etary) effect of the Greek investment y on the Greek exports. In fact, the invest-
ments, specially innovative investments, contribute at improving the competi-
tiveness of Greek goods, favoring the exports.
• For every cooperative strategy z in U , the term nz is the cross-effect of the
cooperative variable z representing the additive level of investment required to
support the production of the production z itself.
• We assume the factors m and n strictly positive.
6.3 Payoff function of the game
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with payoff function given by
f(x, y, z) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1)− z, (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z) =
= (x+ 1/(x+ 1), (1 +m)y) + z(−1, 1 + n)
for every x, y, z in [0, 1].
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Figure 1: 3D representation of the initial game (f(., 0), <).
Figure 2: 3D representation of the initial game (f(., 0), <).
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6.4 Study of the game G = (f,>)
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in U , the section game G(z) = (p(z), >) with
payoff function p(z), defined on the square U × U by
p(z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
is the translation of the game G(0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z(−1, 1 + n),
so that we can study the initial game G(0) and then we can translate the various infor-
mations of the game G(0) by the vector v(z).
So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square S = U2 of G(0) has
vertices 02, e1, 12 and e2, where 02 is the origin, e1 is the first canonical vector (1, 0),
12 is the sum of the two canonical vectors (1, 1) and e2 is the second canonical vector
(0, 1).
6.5 Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G0
In order to determine the Pareto boundary of the payoff space, we shall use the technics
introduced by D. Carfı` in [5] and used in [2],[7], [8], [9] and [10]. We have
p0(x, y) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1), (1 +m)y),
for every x, y in [0, 1]. The transformation of the side [0, e1] is the trace of the (para-
metric) curve c : U → R2 defined by
c(x) = f(x, 0, 0) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1), 0),
that is the segment
[f(0), f(e1)] = [(1, 0), (3/2, 0)].
The transformation of the segment [0, e2] is the trace of the curve c : U → R2 defined
by
c(y) = f(0, y, 0) = (1, (1 +m)y),
that is the segment
[f(0), f(e2)] = [(1, 0), (1, 1 +m)].
The transformation of the segment [e1, 12] is the trace of the curve c : U → R2 defined
by
c(y) = f(1, y, 0) = (1 + 1/2, (1 +m)y),
that is the segment
[f(e1), f(12)] = [(3/2, 0), (3/2, 1 +m)].
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Critical zone of G(0). The Critical zone of the game G(0) is empty. Indeed the
Jacobian matrix is
Jf (x, y) =
(
1 + (1 + x)−2 0
0 1 +m
)
,
which is invertible for every x, y in U .
Payoff space of the game G(0). So, the payoff space of the game G(0) is the
transformation of topological boundary of the strategic square, that is the rectangle
with vertices f(0, 0), f(e1), f(1, 1) and f(e2).
Figure 3: Initial payoff space of the game (f,<).
Nash equilibria. The unique Nash equilibrium is the bistrategy (1, 1). Indeed,
1 + (1 + x)−2 > 0
so the function f1 is increasing with respect to the first argument and analogously
1 +m > 0
so that the Nash equilibrium is (1, 1).
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6.6 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G
The image of the payoff function f , is the union of the family of payoff spaces
(impz)z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the image p0(S) (S is the square U × U )
and of its translation by the vector v(1), namely the payoff space p1(S): the image of
f is an hexagon with vertices f(0, 0), f(e1), f(1, 1) and their translations by v(1).
Figure 4: Payoff space of the game (f,<).
6.7 Pareto maximal boundary of payoff space of G
The Pareto sup-boundary of the coopetitive payoffspace f(S) is the segment [P ′, Q′],
where P ′ = f(1, 1) and
Q′ = P ′ + v(1).
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Possibility of global growth. It is important to note that the absolute slope of the
Pareto (coopetitive) boundary is 1 + n. Thus the collective payoff f1 + f2 of the game
is not constant on the Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game implies the possibility
of a global growth.
Trivial bargaining solutions. The Nash bargaining solution on the segment [P ′, Q′]
with respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain-
ing solution on the segment [P ′, Q′], with respect to the infimum and the supremum
of the Pareto boundary, coincide with the medium point of the segment [P ′, Q′]. This
solution is not acceptable from Germany point of view, it is collectively better than the
supremum of G0 but it is disadvantageous for Germany (it suffers a loss!): this solution
can be thought as a rebalancing solution but it is not realistically implementable.
6.8 Transferable utility solution
In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a transferable utility solution,
indeed:
• the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoff
space is the point
Q′ = (1/2, 2 +m+ n).
6.8.1 Rebalancing win-win best compromise solution.
Thus we propose a rebalancing win-win kind of coopetitive solution, as it follows (in
the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := (0, 5/2 + n) + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convex-
ifying) by the straight lines e2 + Re1 and
(2 + n)e2 + Re1,
these are the straight lines of maximum gain for Greece in games G(0) and G
respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices (3/2, 1) - supremum
of the game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the intersection
of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the bargaining
problem
(s, (supG0, sup s)).
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Figure 5: Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
6.9 Win-win solution
This best payoff coopetitive compromise K represents a win-win solution with respect
to the initial supremum (3/2, 1). So that, as we repeatedly said, also Germany can
increase its initial profit from coopetition.
Win-win strategy procedure. The win-win payoff K can be obtained (by chance)
in a properly coopetitive fashion in the following way:
• 1) the two players agree on the cooperative strategy 1 of the common set C;
• 2) the two players implement their respective Nash strategies of game G(1); the
unique Nash equilibrium of G(1) is the bistrategy (1, 1);
• 3) finally, they share the “social pie”
5/2 + n = (f1 + f2)(1, 1, 1),
in a cooperative fashion (by contract) according to the decomposition K.
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7 The second model
In this second model, we consider a linear affine mutual interaction between Germany
and Greece, more adherent to the real state of the Euro-area.
Specifically, in opposition to the above first model:
• we consider an interaction between the two countries also at the level of their
non-cooperative strategies;
• we assume that Greece also should import (by contract) some German produc-
tion;
• we assume, that the German revenue, given by the exportations in Greece of
the above production, is absorbed by the Germany bank system - in order to
pay the Greece debts with the German bank system - so that this money does
not appear in the payoff function of Germany (as possible gain) but only in the
payoff function of Greece (as a loss).
7.0.1 Main Strategic assumptions.
We assume that:
• any real number x, belonging to the interval E := [0, 3], represents a possible
consumption of Germany (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number y, in the same interval F := E, represents a possible investment
of Greece (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number z, again in the interval C = [0, 2], can be the amount of Greek
exports which is imported by Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
7.1 Payoff function of Germany
We assume that the payoff function of Germany f1 is its Keynesian gross domestic
demand:
• f1 is equal to the private consumption function C1 plus the gross investment
function I1 plus government spending (that we shall assume equal 2, constant in
our interaction) plus export function X1 minus the import function M1, that is
f1 = 2 + C1 + I1 +X1 −M1.
We assume that:
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• the German private consumption function C1 is the first projection of the strate-
gic coopetitive space S := E2 × C, that is defined by
C1(x, y, z) = x,
for every possible german consumption x in E, this because we assumed the
private consumption of Germany to be the first strategic component of strategy
profiles in S;
• the gross investment function I1 is constant on the space S, and by translation
we can suppose I1 equal zero;
• the export function X1 is defined by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3,
for every Greek possible investment y in innovative technology; so we assume
that the export function X1 is a strictly decreasing function with respect to the
second argument;
• the import function M1 is the third projection of the strategic space, namely
M1(x, y, z) = z,
for every cooperative strategy z ∈ 2U , because we assume the import function
M1 depending only upon the cooperative strategy z of the coopetitive game G,
our third strategic component of the strategy profiles in S.
Recap. We then assume as payoff function of Germany its Keynesian gross do-
mestic demand f1, which in our model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the profile
strategy set S, to the sum of the strategies x, −z with the export function X1, viewed
as a reaction function to the Greece investments (so that f1 is the difference of the first
and third projection of the strategy profile space S plus the function export function
X1).
Concluding, the payoff function of Germany is the function f1 of the set S into the
real line R, defined by
f1(x, y, z) = 2 + x− y/3− z,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the space S; where the reaction function X1, defined from
the space S into the real line R by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3,
for every possible investment y of Greece in the interval 3U , is the export function
of Germany mapping the level y of Greece investment into the level X1(x, y, z) of
German export, corresponding to the Greece investment level y.
The function X1 is a strictly decreasing function in the second argument, and this
monotonicity is a relevant property of X1 for our coopetitive model.
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7.2 Payoff function of Greece
We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again its Keynesian gross domestic
demand - private consumption C2 plus gross investment I2 plus government spending
(assumed to be 2) plus exports X2 minus imports M2), so that
f2 = 2 + C2 + I2 +X2 −M2.
We assume that:
• the function C2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the Greek private
consumptions independent from the choice of the strategic triple (x, y, z) in the
space S; in other terms, we assume the function C2 constant on the space S and
by translation we can suppose C2 itself equal zero;
• the function I2 : S → R is defined by
I2(x, y, z) = y + nz,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justification);
• the export function X2 is the linear function defined by
X2(x, y, z) = z +my,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justification);
• the function M2 is now relevant in our analysis, since we assume the import
function, by coopetitive contract with Germany, dependent on the choice of the
triple (x, y, z) in S, specifically, we assume the import function M2 defined on
the space S by
M2(x, y, z) := −2x/3,
so, Greece too now, must import some German product, with value −2x/3 for
each possible German consumption x.
So, the payoff function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the space S into the
real line R, defined by
f2(x, y, z) = 2− 2x/3 + (y + nz) + (z +my) =
= 2− 2x/3 + (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z,
for every pair (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian space S.
We note that the function f2 depends now significantly upon the strategies x in E,
chosen by Germany, and that f2 is again a linear function.
We shall assume the factors m and n non-negative and equal respectively (only for
simplicity) to 0 and 1/2.
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7.3 Payoff function of the game
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with payoff function f : S → R2, given
by
f(x, y, z) = (2 + x− y/3− z, 2− 2x/3 + (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z) =
= (2, 2) + (x− y/3,−2x/3 + (1 +m)y) + z(−1, 1 + n),
for every (x, y, z) in [0, 3]2 × [0, 2].
Figure 6: 3D representation of (f,<).
7.4 Study of the second game G = (f,>)
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in 2U , the section game G(z) = (p(z), >)
with payoff function p(z), defined on the square E2 by
p(z)(x, y) := f(x, y, z),
is the translation of the game G(0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z(−1, 1 + n),
so that, we can study the initial game G(0) and then we can translate the various infor-
mations of the game G(0) by the vectors v(z), to obtain the corresponding information
for the game G(z).
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Figure 7: 3D representation of (f,<).
Figure 8: 3D representation of (f,<).
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So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square E2 of G(0) has ver-
tices 02, 3e1, 32 and 3e2, where 02 is the origin of the plane R2, e1 is the first canonical
vector (1, 0), 32 is the vectors (3, 3) and e2 is the second canonical vector.
7.5 Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G0
In order to determine the the payoff space of the linear game it is sufficient to transform
the four vertices of the strategy square (the game is an affine invertible game), the
critical zone is empty.
7.5.1 Payoff space of the game G(0).
So, the payoff space of the gameG(0) is the transformation of the topological boundary
of the strategy square, that is the parallelogram with vertices f(0, 0), f(3e1), f(3, 3)
and f(3e2). As we show in the below figure 9.
B' = (4,3)
C' = (1,5)
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Figure 9: Initial payoff space of the game (f,<).
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7.5.2 Nash equilibria.
The unique Nash equilibrium is the bistrategy (3, 3). Indeed, the function f1 is linear
increasing with respect to the first argument and analogously the function f2 is linear
and increasing with respect to the second argument.
7.6 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G
The image of the payoff function f , is the union of the family of payoff spaces
(impz)z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the image p0(E2) and of its translation by
the vector v(2), namely the payoff space p2(E2): the image of f is an hexagon with
vertices f(0, 0), f(3e1), f(3, 3) and their translations by v(2). As we show below.
B' = P' = (4,3)
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
Figure 10: Payoff space of the game (f,<).
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7.7 Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space of G
The Pareto sup-boundary of the coopetitive payoff space f(S) is the union of the seg-
ments [A′, B′], [P ′, Q′] and [Q′, C ′′], where P ′ = f(3, 3, 0) and
Q′ = P ′ + v(2).
7.7.1 Possibility of global growth.
It is important to note that the absolute slopes of the segments [A′, B′], [P ′, Q′] of the
Pareto (coopetitive) boundary are strictly greater than 1. Thus the collective payoff
f1 + f2 of the game is not constant on the Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game
implies the possibility of a transferable utility global growth.
7.7.2 Trivial bargaining solutions.
The Nash bargaining solution on the entire payoff space, with respect to the infimum
of the Pareto boundary and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with respect to
the infimum and the supremum of the Pareto boundary, are not acceptable for Germany:
they are collectively (TU) better than the Nash payoff of G0 but they are disadvanta-
geous for Germany (it suffers a loss!): these solutions could be thought as rebalancing
solutions, but they are not realistically implementable.
7.8 Transferable utility solutions
In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a transferable utility solution,
indeed:
• the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoff
space is the point Q′ = (2, 6).
7.8.1 Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum gain for Greece in G.
Thus we propose a rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to maximum gain
for Greece in G, as it follows (in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := Q′ + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convexi-
fying) by the straight lines P ′+Re1 and C ′′+Re1, these are the straight lines of
Nash gain for Greece in the initial game G(0) and of maximum gain for Greece
in G, respectively.
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2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices B′ - Nash payoff of
the game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the
intersection of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the
bargaining problem (s, (B′, sup s)).
Figure 11 below shows the above extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K ′ of the classic bargaining problem (M,B′). It is
evident that the distribution K is a rebalancing solution in favor of Greece with respect
to the classic solution K ′.
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
B' = P' = (4,3)
K
K'
Figure 11: Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
7.8.2 Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum Nash gain for Greece.
We propose here a more realistic rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to
maximum Nash gain for Greece in G, as it follows (again in the case m = 0):
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1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := Q′ + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convex-
ifying) by the straight lines P ′ + Re1 and Q′ + Re1, these are the straight lines
of Nash gain for Greece in the initial game G(0) and of maximum Nash gain for
Greece in G, respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices B′ - Nash payoff of
the game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the
intersection of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the
bargaining problem (s, (B′, sup s)).
Figure 12 below shows the above extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K ′ of the classic bargaining problem (M,B′). The new
distribution K is a rebalancing solution in favor of Greece, more realistic than the
previous rebalancing solution.
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
B' = P' = (4,3)
K
K'
Figure 12: Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
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7.9 Win-win solution
The payoff extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solutionsK represent win-win solutions, with
respect to the initial Nash gain B′. So that, as we repeatedly said, also Germany can
increase its initial profit from coopetition.
7.9.1 Win-win strategy procedure.
The win-win payoff K can be obtained in a properly transferable utility coopetitive
fashion, as it follows:
• 1) the two players agree on the cooperative strategy 2 of the common set C;
• 2) the two players implement their respective Nash strategies in the game G(2),
so competing a` la Nash; the unique Nash equilibrium of the game G(2) is the
bistrategy (3, 3);
• 3) finally, they share the “social pie”
(f1 + f2)(3, 3, 2),
in a transferable utility cooperative fashion (by binding contract) according to
the decomposition K.
8 Conclusions
In conclusion, we desire to stress that:
• the two samples of coopetitive game, provided in the present contribution, are
essentially normative models.
• our samples of coopetition have pointed out the strategies that could bring to win-
win solutions, in a transferable utility and properly cooperative perspective,
for Greece and Germany.
In the paper, we propose:
• a properly coopetitive solution, which is not convenient for Germany, which is
the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution on the coopetitive Nash path, set of
all possible Nash equilibria of the coopetitive interaction.
• transferable utility and properly coopetitive solutions, which are convenient also
for Germany, which are also rebalancing for the Euro area.
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• a new extended Kalai-Smorodinsky method, appropriate to determine rebalanc-
ing partitions, for win-win solutions, on the transferable utility Pareto boundary
of the coopetitive game.
The solutions offered by our coopetitive model:
• aim at “enlarging the pie and sharing it fairly”;
• show win-win and rebalancing outcomes, for the two countries, within a coopet-
itive and positive non constant-sum game path.
• allow us to find “fair” amounts of Greek exports which Germany must coopera-
tively import as well as the optimal Greek investments necessary to improve the
Greek economy in this context, thus contributing to growth and to the stability
of both the Greek and Germany economies.
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